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Tension between the U.S. and the EU have intensified. These tensions are not an “atmospherical” distortion of an otherwise well working partnership but “structural”: A result of a new global constellation after the end of the Cold War. Underlying the current tensions there is a fundamental difference about the way in which the post-Cold War world should be governed. The (“Kantian”) external policy approach of the EU is fundamentally opposed to the (“Hobbesian”) American approach. Therefore, several policy divergences (regarding the UN, non-military international aid, international treaties, the Middle East, so-called rogue states etc.) did emerge even before September 11th. The terror attacks of New York caused a great wave of solidarity within the whole of Europe. Moreover, the “War against terror”, announced by president Bush, seemed to provide an optimal formula to overcome the old divergences and lay the groundwork for new transatlantic cooperation. In reality, European hopes for a “soft power-war” against terrorism did not materialise, on the contrary. Instead of a “multilateral” strategy the U.S. preferred a ad hoc-coalition (coined internationalism á la carte) with an only limited role of international organisations. And with the announcement of the Iraq-war transatlantic divergences and tensions reached a new peak. What are the options of the EU vis a vis the U.S.? In the current debate mainly three options are considered : a policy of rearmament and military modernisation aiming at balancing the American military power ; a policy aiming at increasing the strategic value of Europe for the U.S. and, consequently, increasing influence on American decision building; and a policy of appeasement and the abandonment of an autonomous global political role of the EU. In the foreseeable future, the EU has no military option vis-à-vis the U.S. and it should not search one. Instead, the E.U. and its members should systematically extend and perfect its civilian power instruments. Thereby, the Union will have to accept that its direct influence largely remains limited to the European peace zone but it has also to accept that this zone will, albeit incrementally, grow. |